Audit Planning In Government
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55227/ijerfa.v4i2.427Abstract
Audit planning within governmental environments is often portrayed as a procedural formality, yet in practice it constitutes a contested arena where technical rigor intersects with political sensitivities. This study interrogates the structural dynamics that shape audit planning in the public sector, arguing that the process is not merely a neutral blueprint but a strategic instrument that can illuminate—or obscure—systemic vulnerabilities in state financial governance. By critically examining the architecture of risk assessment, the calibration of materiality, and the orchestration of audit resources, the research exposes how audit planning can either reinforce institutional accountability or inadvertently perpetuate bureaucratic opacity. Employing a qualitative and interpretive lens, the study scrutinizes the often-overlooked frictions embedded in governmental audit preparation, including fragmented documentation ecosystems, asymmetrical information flow between agencies, and the latent influence of political actors who may seek to delimit the scope of scrutiny. The findings reveal that despite its outwardly technical façade, audit planning carries substantial normative implications: it shapes which risks are amplified, which irregularities remain peripheral, and which aspects of governmental performance become narratively visible. Moreover, the analysis contends that the effectiveness of audit planning depends not only on methodological sophistication but also on the institutional courage to confront entrenched inefficiencies and governance distortions. Strengthening audit planning thus requires more than procedural refinement—it demands a recalibration of institutional ethos, bolstered professional independence, and a commitment to epistemic transparency within the audit ecosystem. Ultimately, robust and critically informed audit planning serves as a pivotal mechanism for disrupting complacency, safeguarding public resources, and cultivating a more resilient architecture of democratic accountability.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Karnisa Maharani, Nuratikah Nasution, Silva Nurul Hasanah, Suriani Lafau, Zikra Nurul Annisah, Galih Supraja

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